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W
ashington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia, are cities that share
rich pasts in histories and politics. And although their centers
lie 100 miles apart, the two areas also share something else—
an approximately 12-mile-long border. According to the 2000 U.S. Census,
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and the Richmond
MSA literally bump into one another.
Although no one is likely to mistake the shared boundary area of the
two MSAs for either city’s downtown, MSAs have come to be the standard
measure of a city’s reach. That the two cities deﬁned in this manner stretch
wellover100milesdemonstratesthemagnitudeofpopulationgrowththathas
occurred in both urban areas. This growth is all the more impressive when
one considers that much of it occurred in the last 30 years.
The rapid growth of suburban areas around Washington, D.C., and Rich-
mond, Virginia (and of many cities like them), poses substantial challenges
for both local elected ofﬁcials and residents of those areas. These challenges
include providing for housing, roads, sewers, schools, and the myriad re-
quirements of a population spilling into formerly rural areas. Furthermore,
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becausetheCommonwealthofVirginiaprovideslimitedguidancetolocalities
concerning growth, these questions often must be addressed by local ofﬁcials.
Theinabilityoflocalitiestoaddressgrowthinamoreaggressivemanneris
guidedbytheso-calledDillonrule.1 TheDillonruleisalegalprinciple—used
inVirginia—thataddresseswhethercertainpowersliewithlocalgovernments.
The rule possesses two features. The ﬁrst states that local governments have
three types of powers: in layman’s terms, those granted expressly by the state,
those strongly implied by the state, and those that are essential to localities.
The second part of the Dillon rule states that if there is any reasonable doubt
whether a power has been conferred on a local government, then the power
has not been conferred. This second feature effectively limits the ﬁscal tools
available to localities to those strictly allowed by the state.
Attempts by ofﬁcials of some counties to gain additional ﬁscal powers to
fund the infrastructure required for an increasing population have had limited
success at the statehouse in Richmond. As a result, the “toolkit” available to
localities is often lacking in mechanisms that could prove useful in design-
ing efﬁcient growth policies. Perhaps because their tools are limited by law,
localities have had to rely on available approaches such as taxes on real prop-
erty, zoning, and cash proffers from residential and commercial developers—
policies they can utilize—to stem the pressures from a rising population.
Although property taxes and zoning are generally well understood poli-
cies, proffers are lesser known. In short, proffers are payments made by
developers to local governments as a part of a zoning or rezoning process.
State law dictates that proffers are voluntary. The payments of the proffers
may assist in gaining local government approval of the zoning action, but the
lawisclearthatazoningdecisioncannotbedeniedsolelybecauseadeveloper
refused to pay a speciﬁed proffer amount. State law also speciﬁes that prof-
fers are not impact fees, though in practice they effectively approximate the
latter. That said, development already zoned without proffers cannot legally
be required to offset any impacts and, even in zoning cases where proffers are
involved, the amount may not correspond to impact costs.
Zoning and cash proffers policies are not always popular with residents
and developers in suburban counties. For example, in Loudoun County, Vir-
ginia,alargelyruralcountywestofWashington,D.C.,localpoliciestoaddress
population growth have occasionally reached a fever pitch. At a 1999 public
hearing on Loudoun’s growth policies held at the county courthouse, newspa-
peraccountsdescribedanearriot, notingthatpoliceofﬁcershadtobebrought
in to control the crowd. The episode prompted Thomas Sowell, a noted eco-
nomic columnist, to devote a column to the issues facing Loudoun that ran
in newspapers across the nation. But the vigorous debate over increasing
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population in the county has also been closely watched by a number of groups
interested in growth issues and by surrounding counties, all of whom view
Loudoun’s debate as a guide to the likely direction of policy in general.
The Loudoun debate over population growth and how to address it is not
surprising. Between 1990 and 2002, the county’s population grew at a 7.5
percent annual rate, the second highest in the nation. But the rapid increase in
thenumberofresidentshasnotbeenwelcomedbymanyinthecounty. County
ofﬁcialscontendthatthecostsofinfrastructurerequiredtoservethepopulation
inﬂow exceeds the revenues generated, thus threatening the county’s ﬁscal
soundness (Meeting with Loudoun County Ofﬁcials). In addition, incumbent
residents complain that growth leads to more congestion. Yet there is less
agreement as to the appropriate local policies to address the problems. Given
the limited alternatives available, Loudoun ofﬁcials have primarily adopted a
zoning approach. Speciﬁcally, the county’s board of supervisors has zoned
the easternmost one-third of the county nearest Washington, D.C., (with the
greatest population density) as residential, and it is available to accommodate
additional population growth. In contrast, the westernmost two-thirds of the
county(farthestfromthedowntownD.C.area)hasbeenzonedforlow-density
development only, with allowable densities ranging from one household per
10 acres to one household per 50 acres (see Figure 1). These densities are
so low that they effectively “shut the door” to new residential development in
these areas of the county.
The situation in Loudoun raises many interesting questions concerning
the effects of population growth on localities in the United States and in other
industrial counties. Among the questions are, what kinds of impacts does
population growth generate on county residents’ welfare? Of the policies
available to assist with the cost of population growth, which are used and
why? And perhaps most important, are commonly used policies efﬁcient in
an economic sense?
The debate over these questions in Loudoun County, as in the broader
debate, has been hampered by the lack of a formal model that identiﬁes the
likelyrelevantfactorsandtracesouthowtheysimultaneouslyaffectresidents’
welfare. As a result, discussions between residents and local ofﬁcials often
isolate different arguments in an ad hoc manner, without providing a single
coherent framework. The intent of this paper is to advance the debate by
proposing a more formal treatment.
An examination of Loudoun’s policies within a more formal setting may
serve as a useful benchmark in analyzing the impact of rising population on
counties. Inparticular,wewillconsiderthreeresponsestoarisingpopulation:
zoning, raising the tax rate on real property, and using unrestricted proffers.
Wewilldiscusswhythesepoliciesariseandexplorewhethertheyareefﬁcient.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Population Densities in Loudoun County
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To provide a framework in which these issues can be more systemati-
cally examined, this article presents a simple model of county agglomeration,
inspired by Henderson (1987), where increases in population density lead to
localcongestionandhigherpricesforhousingservices. Themodelrecognizes
that opening a new area of a county to development entails substantial ﬁxed
costs linked to infrastructure construction and maintenance, such as sewage
and water systems, highways, and schools, that are ﬁnanced almost exclu-
sively by local property taxes. Costs are ﬁxed in the sense that opening an
area to development requires a ﬁxed amount of resources that is independent
of the degree of residential development that takes place. Thus, an infrastruc-
turenetworkmusttypicallybeinplacewhenanareaisopened, irrespectiveof
howmanyhouseholdsactuallymovein. Undertheseconditions,wearguethat
localities’ desire to maintain ﬁscal soundness combined with state legislated
restrictions on their ability to raise revenues leaves them with little recourse
outside zoning restrictions.
Since housing prices in a given region generally rise with population
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averagepriceofhousingservicesaspopulationspreadsoutacrossalargerarea.
The model then suggests that consumption of housing services generally rises
but that the overall share of income devoted to housing remains unchanged,
a result veriﬁed by data from Loudoun County. Hence, without sufﬁciently
strong population growth, revenues from property taxes will fail to cover the
additionalcostofinfrastructureassociatedwithnewresidentialdevelopments.
Indeed, Milligan (2003) argues that “one reason the Loudoun board used
the blunt instrument of rezoning is because state lawmakers have resolutely
refused to give localities other tools to manage growth.” In other words,
without the ability to acquire additional funds by raising property tax rates,
the ﬁxed costs associated with infrastructure construction and maintenance
naturally lead to inertia in the creation of new residential developments.2
Becauseourmodelcontainsbothpropertytaxesandcongestionexternali-
ties, the decentralized equilibrium is potentially inefﬁcient. Even so, we show
that in so far as congestion externalities are mainly local in nature, the decen-
tralized distribution of individuals across locations is socially optimal. The
presence of property taxes, however, does distort the consumption of housing
services relative to other types of consumption. We argue that the policy of
charging a proffer per housing unit to developers, which some localities have
effectivelyfollowedinVirginia,constitutesalessdistortionalmeansofﬁnanc-
ing the costs of public infrastructure. In our framework, the use of proffers
can actually help implement the ﬁrst best solution in a decentralized setting.
1. A MODEL OF COUNTYAGGLOMERATION
Consider a county that encompasses S>0 areas, where S ={ 1, 2,...S},
can be thought of as a group of Census tracts. We let M ={ 1,2,...M}⊆
S denote the set of areas open to residential housing. To be equipped for
residential settlement, a region i ∈ M with land area Ai > 0 requires that
a complete infrastructure network be provided and maintained. Examples of
infrastructure include roads, sewer and water systems, schools, and public
transportation, which in aggregate is assumed to carry a ﬁxed resource cost,
 (Ai), with  (0) = 0, and   (Ai)>0.
For now, we assume a ﬁxed county population N, with Ni individuals
living in location i ∈ M. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor,
which he provides inelastically in a core city located outside the county. The
distance from any area i ∈ S to the city varies depending on its location
within the county. In Loudoun, for example, the relatively large area of the
2Although Loudoun has the legal authority to assess taxes against real and personal property
and to accept proffers on housing created by new rezoning actions, ofﬁcials stress that pressure
from residents of the county and from state-level legislators limit their ability to raise these taxes
to levels that would cover the cost and operation of infrastructure. Furthermore, the addition of
new debt by the county is constrained by any deterioration in the county’s revenue-expense ratio.
The county ﬁnance director states that a less favorable ratio reduces the county’s debt rating.38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
county means that some residents live as close as 25 miles from the center of
Washington, D.C., while other residents may live as far away as 50 miles.
Production
Individuals are employed in the production of a county-wide traded good
summarized by,
y = λ
M 
i=1
Ni,λ>0, (1)
wherey denotesthequantityoftradedgoodoutput. Thesegoodsareproduced
competitively by ﬁrms that operate in the city center. Proﬁt maximization by
these ﬁrms immediately implies that
wi = λ = w ∀i, (2)
where wi is the wage paid to individuals living in area i. Since individuals
living in different regions of the county are perfect substitutes in production,
theyallearnthesamewage. Inthemodelbelow,thedistributionofindividuals
across county areas derives from a tradeoff between commuting costs and
the cost of housing services. To the degree that different individuals have
different incomes, this tradeoff would involve net commuting costs instead.
In a setting with net commuting costs, however, the substance of our analysis
would remain largely unchanged.
Individualslivingindifferentareasofthecountyopentodevelopmentalso
consume housing which we treat as a location-speciﬁc good. As in Chatterjee
and Carlino (2001), this good is produced using a technology that is linear in
the traded good. Speciﬁcally, we have that
Gi =

γd
η
i
−1 xi,γ>0,η>0, (3)
where xi represents the quantity of the traded good required to produce Gi
units of the local good in region i. The variable di denotes population density
in location i, Ni/Ai. Thus, the factor γd
η
i in equation (3) captures the notion
thathigherpopulationdensityreducestheefﬁciencyoflocalgoodproduction.
Local good producers, interpreted here as providers of housing services,
operate in a competitive market and maximize proﬁts,
max piGi − xi, (4)
where pi is the price of the local good in region i in units of the traded
good. These producers take population density in each county area as given.
Substituting for xi in equation (4), and maximizing with respect to Gi, the
price of the local good in county area i will then reﬂect its marginal cost,
pi = γ

Ni
Ai
η
. (5)R. E. Owens and P.-D. G. Sarte:Accomodating Rising Population 39
Therefore, as population increases in location i, so does the price of housing
services in that area.
Preferences
Individuals that live in county location i have linear preferences over an ag-
gregate good, Ci, given by
Ci = [(1 − δi)gi]
θ c
1−θ
i , (6)
where 0 <θ<1 and 0 <δ i < 1 ∀i. In equation (6), ci and gi represent
consumption of the traded and local good, respectively. Since gi represents
housing services, individuals consuming gi can be thought of as renters. The
parameter δi captures the reduction in utility imposed by commuting between
homeandwork. Wecanthinkofthisreductioninthefollowingway. Suppose
twoidenticalhousesdifferonlyinhowfartheyarelocatedfromtheworkplace
atthecitycenter. Aresidentlivingatthemoredistanthousespendsmoretime
commuting and correspondingly spends less time at home, thus getting less
satisfaction (i.e., a higher δi) from a given amount of housing services. It is
worth noting, though, that distance from the city center is not the only source
of differences in commuting times. In practice, the location of roads, bridges,
mountains, and physical features generally affect commuting times. Thus,
it is entirely possible to ﬁnd locations nearer to the city center that actually
have longer commuting times to the city core. As a general rule, however,
we expect that differences in housing services consumption will reﬂect the
distance from the city center and the associated commute costs.
Each individual living in location i faces the following budget constraint,
pigi + ci ≤ w − τpigi, (7)
where τ is a county-wide property tax that helps cover the cost of public
infrastructure in areas open to development. In Loudoun County, the total
real property and personal taxes collected each year amounts to $400 million,
the approximate cost of operating the county’s school system. Utility maxi-
mization subject to constraint (7) implies that a mobile individual residing in
location i chooses
gi =
θw
(1 + τ)pi
(8)
and
ci = (1 − θ)w. (9)
Equilibrium
We focus on equilibria where the distribution of individuals across county
locations leaves no region open to development unoccupied. From equations40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
(3) and (9), the indirect utility achieved by an individual living in location i
is,
Vi = θθ(1 − θ)θ(1 − δi)θ(1 + τ)−θp
−θ
i w, (10)
or, substituting for pi and w,
Vi = θθ(1 − θ)θ(1 − δi)θ(1 + τ)−θγ −θ

Ni
Ai
−θη
λ. (11)
Equilibrium with free movement of individuals requires that utility be equal-
ized across all locations, Vi = V ∀i ∈ M. If there were a pair of locations i
and j with Vi > Vj, individuals would seek to move from j to i. This would
raise congestion in i and lower it in j until Vi and Vj were equalized. In
addition, the sum of individuals across locations open to development must
equal the exogenous county-wide population,
M 
i=1
Ni = N. (12)
Finally, the county must cover the ﬁxed costs associated with providing
and maintaining public infrastructure in the developed areas,
M 
i=1
Niτpigi =
M 
i=1
 (Ai), (13)
where the left-hand side of the above expression denotes tax revenues from
property taxes.
Proposition:
Under the maintained hypotheses, there exists a unique distribution of
individuals across open locations, Ni,i= 1,...,M, with common utility,
V > 0.
Proof:
Observe that the conditions Vi = V ∀i ∈ M and
M
i=1 Ni = N make
up M + 1 equations in M + 1 unknowns, namely Ni,i= 1,...,M, and V.
Thus, rewrite equation (11) as
Ni =

V
θθ(1 − θ)θ(1 − δi)θ(1 + τ)−θγ −θλ
− 1
θη
Ai.
Substituting this expression into equation (12), it follows that V must solve
M 
i=1

V
θθ(1 − θ)θ(1 − δi)θ(1 + τ)−θγ −θλ
− 1
θη
Ai = N.
Deﬁne the left-hand side of the above expression as F(V), and note that
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the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists V > 0 such that F(V) = N.I n
addition, because F(V) is strictly decreasing in V on [0,∞), this solution is
unique.
Given the solution for V, one can then simply solve for the distribution of
individuals across location using (11).
The model of county agglomeration we have just presented possesses two
important features that emerge as equilibrium outcomes.
First, the relative price of housing services between any two county areas
reﬂects differences in commuting costs. In particular, from equation (10), the
condition that Vi = Vj for any two areas open to residential housing implies
that
pi = pj

1 − δi
1 − δj

∀i and j ∈ M. (14)
In other words, in choosing where to live within the county, individuals will
trade off the price of housing services against commuting costs. In partic-
ular, county locations that involve a shorter commute to work will tend to
have higher-priced housing services. In fact, this result appears to hold in
Loudoun, though the heterogeneity of the housing stock makes a precise mea-
sure difﬁcult. According to county ofﬁcials, identical houses in areas with
lower commuting costs generally command higher prices (and thus rents)
than similar houses in areas of the county with higher commuting costs.
Second,becausepricesofhousingservicesreﬂectcongestionexternalities
driven by higher density, county areas with higher commuting costs will also
have lower densities. In (14), δi <δ j implies that pi >p j. By equation (5),
we then also have that di >d j.
At this stage, we ﬁnd it useful to introduce a numerical example to better
highlight key features of our model as the economic environment changes.
Speciﬁcally, given the debate surrounding Loudoun County, we focus on the
effectsofarisingcountypopulationaswellasthoseofachangeinthenumber
of areas open to residential housing. We shall also use this numerical example
below in making comparisons with the efﬁcient solution.
Calibration to Current Loudoun County Benchmarks
According to our model, differences in commuting costs, δi, lead to varying
densities in different regions. Therefore, as shown in Figure 1, we partition
the developed eastern region of Loudoun County (i.e., the region unaffected
by zoning restrictions) into density quintiles and set δi to match the density
of each of the ﬁve areas. The associated ﬁve land areas have sizes, in square
miles, 116.4, 27.3, 13.2, 8.2, and 5.7, and we calibrate Ai to match each of
these land areas. The population density in these ﬁve areas are, in people per
square mile, 208.21, 1,072.71, 1,909.00, 3,563.51, and 5,613.52. Observe in
Figure 1 that low-density areas tend to be farther away from Fairfax County42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Model Parameters
Calibrated Benchmark Parameters Value
Preferences
θ Housing share of income 0.25%
Technology
λ Per capita income $50,238
γ Scalar in density congestion 93.41
η Curvature in density congestion 0.49
Geography
δi Commuting costs [0.09, 0.11, 0.14, 0.17, 0.23]
Ai Land area (square miles) [5.7, 8.2, 13.2, 27.3, 116.4]
N Population 139,873
and Washington, D.C., where Loudoun County residents typically commute
to work.
According to the U.S. Census, the population in the developed areas of
LoudounCountycurrentlystandsat139,873,andwesetN tomatchthisvalue.
We choose λ to reﬂect an individual’s yearly earnings in the county, $50,238.
Thisnumberreﬂectsaweightedaverageofmaleandfemalefull-timeworkers.
From the Census, the share of income spent on housing and property taxes,
θ, is approximately 0.25. It is difﬁcult to get an accurate housing price per
square foot corresponding to each region, where we think of square footage
as a proxy for housing services. However, data from the Loudoun County
Ofﬁce of Mapping and Geographic Information suggests that $143 per square
foot is a reasonable upper bound for that county. We then choose γ to match
this upper bound in equilibrium, γ = 93.41, and set η assuming a 15 percent
gradient in housing prices from the most to the least dense area.
Finally, because individuals spend pigi of their yearly disposable income
on housing services, current housing values, V, for the typical individual are
given by
V = φ (pigi), (15)
φ =
1
r
	
(1 + r)T+1 − 1
(1 + r)T


,
where φ is a factor that captures the present value of a one dollar annuity
discounted over the number of years that a house provides services, T, and
rate, r. In particular, given that the typical household contains 2.7 individuals
in Loudoun County, our model suggests that the representative house is worth
approximately $435,000 when T = 30 and r = 0.05. Property tax rates in
Loudoun County are currently set to 1.08 percent of housing values. SinceR. E. Owens and P.-D. G. Sarte:Accomodating Rising Population 43
Table 2 Model and Data Statistics
Population Distribution
Loudoun County [24,227; 29,265; 25,226; 29,348; 31,807]
Model [24,231; 29,238; 25,235; 29,375; 31,791]
Density Distribution
Loudoun County [208.21; 1,072.71; 1,909.35; 3,563.51; 5,613.52]
Model [208.24; 1,071.79; 1,910.36; 3,569.32; 5,616.88]
Average Housing Prices
Loudoun County $427,199
Model $435,279
Household Property Taxes
Loudoun County $4,613.00
Model $4,701.00
the property tax in (7) applies to pigi rather than φ (npigi), where n is the
number of individuals per household, we let τ = 0.0108φn, or 0.18. This tax
generatesabout$4,700perhouseholdyearly. Theparametersthatachieveour
calibration targets are summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 reports the model-generated population and density distribution
ineachoftheﬁveareasdepictedinFigure1. Asshowninthetable,themodel,
although stylized, does well in reproducing actual Loudoun County statistics.
In addition, we are also able to approximate statistics we had not explicitly
targeted. For instance, both average housing prices and yearly property taxes
collected per household conform relatively well to the data.
Zoning Restrictions in the Face of Increasing
Population
The model above implies that in a given year, approximately $243 million are
collectedinpropertytaxesinthedevelopedregionofLoudounCounty.3 Since
this revenue is used exclusively to ﬁnance the provision and maintenance of
publicinfrastructure, thecorrespondingﬁxedcostscometoslightlymorethan
$1.42 million per square mile.
3According to the 2000 Census, in total, Loudoun County collects $300 million in real
property taxes, approximately $223 million of which, close to the model’s prediction, comes from
the eastern, developed portion of the county.44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Suppose that local authorities were to consider lifting zoning restrictions
on 10 additional square miles adjacent to the already developed part of the
county. Because we assume this area to be immediately adjacent to the least
dense populated region, we posit similar commuting costs, δ = 0.23. Res-
idents of the new area, therefore, would incur commuting costs equivalent
to a 23 percent reduction in housing services. Moreover, according to our
calculations, opening this region to development would require an additional
$14.2 million in property taxes.
With no population growth and no adjustment in property tax rates, our
modelimpliesthattotalpropertytaxescollectedwouldalsoremainunchanged.
The existing population would spread out across a larger area thus lowering
density and, by equation (5), local goods’ prices. However, by equation (8),
individuals would then increase their consumption of housing services so as
to leave the share of income they spend on housing exactly unchanged. In
practice, the share of income devoted to housing services is indeed nearly
constant over time, not only in Loudoun County and Virginia, but nationally.
Since this amount helps determine housing values in equation (15), it follows
that these values would then remain unaffected and so would the resulting
property taxes. Hence, opening a new area to residential housing is feasible
only if the rate of net migration into the county is sufﬁcient to generate tax
revenues equal to the additional ﬁxed costs incurred.
Inourhypotheticalexample,theexistingcountypopulationwouldhaveto
increasebyapproximately5.9percenttoyieldanincreaseinthetaxbaselarge
enough to generate an additional $14.2 million. This represents an increase of
around 8,250 individuals or 3,050 households. Thus, given that installing and
maintaining infrastructure entails substantial ﬁxed costs, our analysis implies
inertiainthecreationofnewdevelopments. Thatis, thepopulationresidingin
areas already open to development has to reach a high enough threshold that
the tax base can cover the additional cost of new infrastructure. Therefore,
with legislated and/or political limits on a county’s ability to raise property
tax rates, local authorities have little practical recourse other than to appeal to
low-density zoning restrictions. Note that while population grows to meet a
threshold that would allow the county to open a new area, density increases,
local goods prices rise, and consumption of housing services fall. Consump-
tion of the aggregate good, Ci, in equation (6), therefore, decreases for the
representative individual.4 It is no surprise, therefore, that some county resi-
dents complain of congestion and exert pressure on Loudoun County’s board
of supervisors to lift zoning restrictions.
It is important to note that given a ﬁxed county population, N, opening
a new area of the county to residential development in our framework does
not necessarily increase welfare. On the one hand, the new area would allow
for lower population density and lower congestion in existing regions of the
4 Recall that all individuals have the same utility in equilibrium, Ci = Cj ∀i,j ∈ M.R. E. Owens and P.-D. G. Sarte:Accomodating Rising Population 45
county. This effect induces individuals to consume more housing services
which increases welfare. On the other hand, to the degree that the cost of
additional infrastructure raises property tax rates, consumption of housing
serviceswouldfall. Onnet,itisnotclearthatconsumptionofhousingservices
wouldincreaseifanadditionalregionofthecountywerezonedforresidential
settlement. Furthermore, from (6), commuting costs associated with the new
area would also play a direct role in the evaluation of welfare.
In Loudoun County, rates of increase in the county’s population are fore-
casttoremainhigh,thoughnotashighasinthe1990s. Loudoun’sDepartment
of Economic Development projects that the county’s population will rise at
an average annual rate of 4.7 percent over the next nine years, about triple the
rate of population growth expected in the United States over the same period.
Thus, it is likely that an imbalance between population growth, revenues, and
infrastructure adequacy will continue to face the county.
2. THE SOCIAL PLANNER’S PROBLEM
We now show that the outcomes in the decentralized county economy are not
Pareto optimal. Speciﬁcally, we can assess Pareto optimality by comparing
our results above with the results from the same problem for a hypothetical
social planner. Contrary to most models in regional economics, the source of
inefﬁciency in our framework does not stem from the congestion externalities
linked to density. In our model, these externalities are local in nature and,
therefore, directly reﬂected in the price of housing services in the concerned
region. Inessence,thetechnologyin(3)assumesthatgreaterdensityinregion
i congeststheproductionofhousingservicesinthatregion, andnotinanother
region that is further away.5 The population density distribution, therefore,
replicates that which emerges in the decentralized equilibrium. The presence
of county taxes, however, does distort the consumption of housing services
relativetoothertypesofconsumption. Wearguethatlocalgovernmentshould
ﬁnance infrastructure by charging developers a lump sum proffer per housing
unit rather than relying on property taxes. Some localities in Virginia charge
proffers. We show that their approach can actually help implement the ﬁrst
best solution in the decentralized setting.
The social planner looks to maximize the utility of households in the
county, as given by
M 
i=1
Ni[(1 − δi)gi]θc
1−θ
i . (16)
5 This is also the case in Chatterjee and Carlino (2001).46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The only constraints faced by the planner are the county’s resource constraint,
M 
i=1
Nici +
M 
i=1
Nixi +
M 
i=1
 (Ai) = λ
M 
i=1
Ni, (17)
and the requirement that population in regions open to development add up
to county population, (12). The middle term on the left-hand side of (17)
captures the resource costs, in units of the traded good, associated with the
county-wide provision of housing services, where xi is implicitly deﬁned by
the technology in (3).
The planner’s optimal choice of regional traded good consumption, ci,
local good consumption, gi, and regional population, Ni, are respectively
given by
(1 − θ)[(1 − δi)gi]θc
−θ
i = µ2, (18)
θ[(1 − δi)gi]θ−1(1 − δi)c
1−θ
i = µ2γ

Ni
Ai
η
, (19)
and
[(1 − δi)gi]θc
1−θ
i + µ2
	
λ − ci − γ(1 + η)

Ni
Ai
η
gi


− µ1 = 0, (20)
where µ1 ≥ 0 and µ2 ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints (12) and (17).
We now demonstrate that the planner’s solution entails the same distribu-
tion of population across regions as that found in the decentralized equilib-
rium. To see this, observe ﬁrst from (14) that the decentralized allocation of
individuals across regions can be summarized by
(1 − δj)γ −1

Nj
Aj
−η
= (1 − δi)γ −1

Ni
Ai
−η
∀i and j ∈ M. (21)
Under the optimal solution, we can use equations (18) and (19) to show that
(1 − θ)θ(1 − δi)γ −1

Ni
Ai
−η
= µ
1
θ
2 ∀i ∈ M. (22)
Since µ2 is constant across regions, equation (22) implies (21), and the op-
timal allocation of individuals across locations replicates that of the decen-
tralized equilibrium. Because in our model, congestion externalities reduce
the production efﬁciency of housing services locally, individuals who move
and congest a given region have to pay higher prices for housing services in
that region. As in Chatterjee and Carlino (2001), the formulation of local
externalities seems to us more reasonable than one where a region’s densityR. E. Owens and P.-D. G. Sarte:Accomodating Rising Population 47
decreases the production efﬁciency of housing services in another area that is
potentially much further away.6
It remains that in the decentralized equilibrium, the presence of taxes on
housing services distorts the allocation of consumption between the traded
and local good. In our model, this distortion is small and results only in a 0.2
percent loss in welfare when measured in terms of the aggregate consumption
basket, Ci. However, we now argue that allowing localities to charge devel-
opers a lump sum proffer to ﬁnance public infrastructure can help remove the
distortion altogether.
Using Lump Sum Proffers as a Means to Finance
Infrastructure
The main trouble with county taxes, as depicted in (7), is that they are propor-
tional to housing services—and thus housing values—which leads to subopti-
maldecentralizedallocations. Inotherwords, individualsineverylocalityare
led to consume less housing services than they otherwise would absent taxes.
Historically, however, localities inVirginia have had the ability to accept vol-
untary lump sum cash proffers from residential developers, independent of
the quantity of housing services they provide.7 The courts in Virginia have
held that the absence of “voluntary” payments cannot be the sole reason for
denying zoning or rezoning. However, many counties, including Loudoun,
publicize the recommended proffers per residential housing unit constructed.
Inasettingwhereanewareaisopenedtodevelopment, allhousesconstructed
would be subject to a lump sum proffer. In the case of opening a new area to
housing, zoning, or rezoning action would be necessary so that proffers could
apply to all housing.
We now show that, in the decentralized equilibrium, these proffers would
simply be passed on to consumers, provided developers operate in a com-
petitive market. More importantly, because they are non-distortionary, using
these proffers in lieu of property taxes would allow the market equilibrium to
replicate the social optimum.
Suppose that each county locality charges developers a cash proffer,  i,
per housing unit that is unrelated to the amount of housing services they sell,
Gi.8 In equilibrium, these cash proffers have to be such that
M
i=1 Ni i = M
i=1  (Ai) to maintain the feasibility of areas open to development. Let
6 Note that the social optimum would yield population allocations different than those given
by the decentralized equilibrium if congestion had an effect on commuting costs.
7 In practice, these proffers can only be raised following zoning or rezoning actions.
8 Observe that housing units can be of different sizes, our proxy for Gi. Furthermore, an
implicit assumption here is that each individual requires one housing unit, although individuals can
combine into households.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
R(Gi) = piGi +  i denote a developer’s revenue from selling Gi units
of housing services in locality i. Developers are assumed to operate in a
competitive market, and we allow for any pricing rule that enables ﬁrms to
charge both a price per unit of housing services, pi, and a ﬁxed amount,  i,
that could potentially be zero.9
From (3), a developer’s proﬁts in terms of the traded good are given by
R(Gi) − γd
η
i Gi −  i. (23)
It is then easy to see that the pricing rule whereby ﬁrms charge γd
η
i per unit of
housing services and pass on the entire cash proffer to consumers constitutes
a unique equilibrium pricing rule. First, to see why it is an equilibrium rule,
observe that a ﬁrm with a pricing strategy such that R(Gi)>γ d
η
i Gi +  i
would have no customers. Other ﬁrms would be able to charge slightly less
and capture the entire demand while still making at least zero proﬁts. On
the other hand, a pricing rule that yielded revenues less than γd
η
i Gi +  i
would have the ﬁrm make negative proﬁts and is not sustainable. Therefore,
in equilibrium, ﬁrm revenues have to be exactly γd
η
i +  i. Second, to see
why {pi,  i}={ γd
η
i ,  i}∀ i ∈ M represents a unique equilibrium pricing
rule, consider any other strategy,  pi = γd
η
i + ε, ε ≷ 0 and   i. Because
total revenue must be γd
η
i +  i in equilibrium, a ﬁrm that charges  pi per
unit of housing services would have to adjust the ﬁxed portion of its pricing
strategy such that   i =  i − εGi. But this contradicts the notion that   i is
independent of Gi. Therefore, the rule whereby ﬁrms charge marginal cost
per unit of housing services and pass on the entire cash proffer required by the
county to individuals is the only equilibrium pricing rule.10
Of course, the main point here is that faced with this pricing rule, individ-
uals’budget constraint (7) in the decentralized county economy becomes
(pigi +  i) + ci ≤ w. (24)
Hence, their consumption of housing services is no longer distorted relative
to other types of consumption, and the decentralized equilibrium can achieve
the ﬁrst best solution. Observe that while individuals pay more for housing
services relative to the previous section, they no longer have to pay taxes
on housing services. In fact, since all that matters in terms of providing
county-wideinfrastructureanditsoperationisthatitscostsbecoveredbycash
proffers collected from developers,
M
i=1  (Ai) =
M
i=1 Ni i, the county
can design a regional distribution of proffers such that the difference between
what individuals now pay for housing services and what they paid in the
9 Since our model is static and does not distinguish between housing stock built at different
dates, we think of  i as the yearly amount corresponding to the capitalized proffer value that a
developer would be charged at the time of construction.
10 Observe also that any two-part pricing strategy that successfully attracts customers away
from {pi, i}={ γd
η
i , i} necessarily yields negative proﬁts.R. E. Owens and P.-D. G. Sarte:Accomodating Rising Population 49
previoussectionexactlyequalswhattheywereoriginallyspendinginproperty
taxes,  i =  i = τpigi. There is no sense, therefore, in which this proffer-
based policy would ultimately end up being more costly to individuals.
If proffers allow counties to offset the cost of infrastructure and its opera-
tion associated with new housing, why is zoning still used along with proffers
in Loudoun County? The answer lies in the legal restrictions associated with
proffers. Legally, proffers can be used to offset fully or partially only the
capital costs of infrastructure, not operating costs. In the case of schools, for
example, the operating cost is a substantial portion of the total cost, mean-
ing that proffers will not overcome the ﬁxed cost problem discussed earlier.
Without the ability to use proffers to offset infrastructure costs fully, counties
resort to zoning to limit the ﬁscal impact of rising population.
3. SUMMARY REMARKS
Rapidlyincreasingpopulationinformerlyruralcountiesonthefringeofurban
areas has strained local governments’ability to provide infrastructure, raising
congestion levels. The difﬁculty in providing adequate infrastructure lies in
the ﬁxed cost nature of infrastructure production as well as political and legal
restrictions on localities’ ability to raise revenue. Using a simple model of
locational choice, we ﬁnd that local ofﬁcials could best balance population
and infrastructure through a lump-sum proffer fee on developers. Provided
that the market in which developers operate is competitive, this impact fee
is likely to be passed onto users of housing services. This approach has the
well-known advantage of being non-distortionary with respect to individuals’
consumption decisions. Alternatively, balancing infrastructure and popula-
tion can be achieved through setting an appropriate real property tax, though
this approach introduces distortions into individuals’consumption decisions,
leaving them with less aggregate consumption than with lump sum fees.
Inaddition, weﬁndthatlegalandpoliticalrestrictionsoncountyofﬁcials’
use of proffers and real property taxes have led them to the use of zoning
in practice. Given the substantial ﬁxed costs associated with infrastructure
provisionandtheuseofzoning,risingpopulationleadstoincreasedcongestion
before the number of households reaches a high enough threshold to make it
feasible to open up a new land area. Ultimately, however, zoning remains an
inefﬁcient means to address localities’ infrastructure and population issues.
A more efﬁcient solution would be to lessen restrictions on localities’ use of
proffers and their ability to raise revenue more generally.
Although Loudoun County, Virginia, has been used as a case study for
calibrationofourmodel,theframeworksetoutinthispapershouldbebroadly
applicable to the problem associated with rising population in many areas of
the United States. Indeed, the ﬁxed cost aspect of infrastructure provision50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
combined with restrictions on localities’ability to raise revenue appear to be
applicable to localities broadly.
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